

The University of Chicago

GENERAL JAMES LONGSTREET
AND THE CIVIL WAR

A PART OF A DISSERTATION SUBMITTED TO
THE FACULTY OF THE DIVISION OF THE
SOCIAL SCIENCES IN CANDIDACY FOR THE
DEGREE OF DOCTOR OF PHILOSOPHY

DEPARTMENT OF HISTORY

1934

By
DONALD BRIDGMAN SANGER

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A considerable controversy has existed since the close of the Civil War concerning General Longstreet's relations with General Lee in general, and whether Longstreet in particular was responsible for Lee's failure at Gettysburg. Although Longstreet's entire service with the Confederacy has been variously criticized, the crux of the controversy seems to hinge on the Gettysburg Campaign. This has been treated in length in the dissertation¹ as part of the whole story of General Longstreet's military career.

James Longstreet was born in South Carolina on January 8, 1821, of "small planter" stock and of modest circumstances. His early years were spent on the family plantation near Gainesville, Georgia, where he learned much from the forest and grew strong in body under the simple country regime. His father died when James was still but a boy, as a result of which James was sent to live with his uncle, Augustus Baldwin Longstreet. Destined for a career in the army, the uncle schooled him for the examinations, and James was admitted to West Point from Alabama in the summer of 1838.

As a student, James Longstreet was below average. He seemed to lack the facility for learning from books. Consequently he was almost at the bottom of his class when he graduated in 1842. In sports, horsemanship, and the activities calling for high leadership, Longstreet seems to have excelled.

Assigned to the Infantry, Lieut. Longstreet had a varied and interesting life as a subaltern in the Indian Wars of Florida,

¹The complete dissertation is on file only in the University of Chicago Libraries.

with Taylor's army of occupation and with Scott in Mexico. In the campaigns against Mexico City, Longstreet was twice breveted for gallantry in action, and was severely wounded in the fighting against Chapultepec.

In 1848 Brevet Major Longstreet was back in the United States and married Maria Louise Garland on March 8th. They shortly journeyed to Texas, where Longstreet went on frontier duty in West Texas. This lasted nearly ten years, until in 1860 he was induced to accept permanent appointment as Major Paymaster. When the Civil War broke, Major Longstreet was on duty at Albuquerque, New Mexico.

Prior to the outbreak of the war, Major Longstreet had signified his intention of joining the South. He resigned his commission in the United States service on June 1, 1861, and journeyed to Richmond where, after applying for a paymaster's appointment, President Davis commissioned him a brigadier general of the line.

He was assigned to command the 4th Brigade in General Beauregard's army with station near Manassas, Virginia.

With but a few days to organize his command, General Longstreet moved to the Bull Run defensive line and took position opposite Blackburn's Ford. He participated with his command in the fighting preliminary to the battle of Bull Run, and displayed excellent qualities of leadership as well as personal bravery. He came under the notice of General Joseph E. Johnston, who within a few days gave him the task of organizing and commanding the service of security for the Army of the Potomac (Confederate). This work was done with skill and efficiency.

When the army withdrew to the line of the Rapoahannock in the early spring of 1862, Longstreet's troops covered the withdrawal. A period of reorganization followed, and General Longstreet was assigned to the command of an independent division. Later,

when the Union movement to the Peninsula was in progress, Longstreet acted as second in command to General Joseph E. Johnston in directing the tactical employment of the command and its movement to the lower Peninsula.

When McClellan advanced on Richmond in early May, 1862, General Longstreet covered the withdrawal of the Confederate army and successfully fought a two days' rear guard action at Williamsburg (May 4-5) against superior forces. His ability as a troop leader and as a fighting general was here more clearly shown.

With the withdrawal of McDowell's army from the vicinity of Fredericksburg to Washington, in response to Jackson's brilliant campaigns in the Shenandoah Valley, the Confederate army near Richmond prepared to take the offensive. The Battle of Seven Pines (May 28) marked Johnston's abortive attempt to dislodge McClellan's right corps, which was north of the Chickahominy. In the opening movements of this engagement, General Longstreet either misconstrued his orders or else followed out the less valuable of the two schemes of maneuver which he and General Johnston had discussed. There were no written orders; and the resulting confusion led to unproductive results. General Johnston was wounded, and his successor failed to better the Confederate situation.

General R. E. Lee now assumed command of the army (June 1, 1862), and prepared it for an offensive against McClellan in conjunction with the employment of Jackson's Valley command north of the Chickahominy. The Seven Days battles which followed gave ample evidence of Lee's strategic sufficiency and would undoubtedly have resulted in a disaster for McClellan had the Confederate lesser commanders measured up to the fullness of their tasks. Jackson delayed; Magruder proved slow; Longstreet blundered twice; and although McClellan was forced back from Richmond, he escaped with his army.

General Pope's movement on Richmond from the north followed hard on the Peninsula campaign. The danger was great, and to continue a sound defense of the capital, Lee was forced to take the offensive with the hope that, through strategy rather than pitched battle, he could maneuver Pope out of Virginia.

The Army of Northern Virginia was now organized into two large wings or corps of approximately 30,000 men each; and with an independent cavalry corps under J. E. B. Stuart of fully half this strength. General Longstreet had now become senior Lieutenant General and had been put in command of the First Corps. Jackson commanded the Second Corps.

After some maneuvering for position and several disappointing efforts to gain an advantage over Pope, Lee sent Jackson on a wide turning movement to reach Pope's rear and destroy his base at Manassas Junction. To Longstreet was given the task of holding Pope in place along the Rappahannock until Jackson could gain the Union line of communications. Jackson's march was made without incident, and his corps occupied Manassas Junction on the night of August 27th, after having passed around the Union right flank by way of Salem and Thoroughfare Gap.

With Jackson safely on his way, Longstreet commenced a flank march up the Rappahannock following Jackson's route, but with his troops in light contact with those of Pope at all times. He had some opposition at Thoroughfare Gap, but the Union commander failed to realize the importance of his mission and permitted Longstreet's force to pass through the Gap and join Jackson.

In the meantime, Jackson had precipitated the fight, and all of Pope's divisions were hurrying to catch Jackson before Longstreet could join. Pope's estimate of the situation proved faulty, and the two wings of the Confederate army were brought together without serious opposition.

Although General Lee wished to bring on the real engagement at once, Longstreet counseled delay for reconnaissance purposes and to gain information. This was concurred in reluctantly by General Lee.

The Second Battle of Manassas commenced early the next day (August 29) with an assault in depth on Jackson's front. No attack was made on Longstreet, although his left adjoined Jackson's right and his line was more or less parallel to the axis of the Union advance. As the fighting progressed, Longstreet seized the opportunity when Jackson was heavily engaged, to launch an enveloping counter attack against the Union left flank and rear. This was preceded by a devastating artillery preparation which cut the Union assault waves to pieces. The assault of the First Corps was completely successful; Pope's army was driven in disorder from the field; and Jackson was sent in close pursuit. General Lee wisely refrained from attempting an attack on Washington, even though Pope had retired to that city with a badly disorganized army.

Lee's problem now was to prevent another Union campaign against Richmond that summer. He decided to invade Maryland for the avowed purpose of holding the Union forces close to their capital through strategic pressure. As a secondary mission he hoped for supplies and recruits and a favorable political reaction.

In preparing for this campaign he broached to Longstreet the subject of diverting part of his force to capture Harper's Ferry. General Longstreet raised instant objection that this would be an unwise and risky move. Dropping the subject with Longstreet, Lee next approached Jackson, who fell in with his views, and the plans were made to have Longstreet continue on behind the mountains to Hagerstown, while Jackson followed the north bank of the Potomac, which he was to cross near Martinsburg and descend on Harper's Ferry from the west.

Through ill fortune one of Lee's movement orders fell into the hands of General McClellan, who was thus apprised of Lee's dispersed situation. Had he moved promptly, Lee's army would have been well nigh destroyed. His advanced troops caught up with Longstreet's corps at Turner's Gap, while another large force moved to intercept Jackson. D. H. Hill of Longstreet's corps held Turner's Gap, while Longstreet, with Lee, had gone to Hagerstown. A terrible battle resulted when Hill blocked the gap, which he was successful in holding all day, while Longstreet hurried to him by a forced march. The Union forces were so overpowering that Lee was forced to retire to the Potomac under cover of darkness.

Reassured by Jackson's victory at Harper's Ferry, Lee decided to make a stand on the Maryland side and, consequently, occupied the high ground near Sharpsburg. Longstreet's corps held the right of the line while Jackson with Stuart occupied the left. Two days of vicious fighting followed, resulting in a drawn battle. Had McClellan used his entire available force, he could have overwhelmed Lee's army. As it turned out, Lee was able to escape to Virginia with hardly an interruption.

In the Maryland Campaign of 1862, General Longstreet showed increased tactical skill and a high degree of leadership. His remonstrance to Lee over the diversion toward Harper's Ferry marks his appreciation of sound tactics and his close and almost intimate relationship with Lee. In the opinion of the writer, Longstreet offered sound advice.

Longstreet was now tacitly assigned the office of second in command. Following the abortive campaign across the Potomac, he led the advance troops down the Rappahannock to Fredericksburg, which he organized for defense. That his dispositions were sound is indicated by the results of the battle of Fredericksburg, when General Burnside (McClellan's successor) was decisively defeated

in the river crossing operations on December 12 and 13. This ended the campaigns of 1862 in the East.

Conditions of supply as well as the necessity for putting Petersburg in a condition of strong defense induced General Lee to send Longstreet with two of his divisions for duty south of the James during the early winter and spring of 1863. Here, as along the Rappahannock, General Longstreet was called upon to lay out a system of defensive works as well as to scour the country for supplies. General's Lee's ability to hold off Grant's huge forces during the spring of 1865 bears testimony to the skill with which General Longstreet organized the Petersburg sector for defense. He was engaged on this work and on that of securing the stocks of forage and meats when the battle of Chancellorsville was fought. He rejoined the Army of Northern Virginia late in May after having remained some time in Richmond directing the defense of the city and securing Lee's communications.

While in Richmond, General Longstreet seems to have brought to the notice of the Secretary of War the critical military value of Chattanooga and the necessity for arranging for its defense. He advocated a determined offensive in the West with a view to driving back the Union forces in Tennessee and occupying the Ohio valley. This was his one strategic conception that had the real quality of generalship.

When the matter was discussed with General Lee, it was found that Lee did not care to go West in person and, what is more important, a new campaign across the Potomac was being planned for the purpose of enticing the Union army out of Virginia. General Lee was not unmindful of the great political benefits that would obtain after a victory on northern soil and also the far-reaching effects in Europe should he prove successful in an engagement with the main Union army.

General Longstreet endorsed Lee's plans, but suggested that the entire campaign should be based on offensive-defensive principles--the avoidance of battle except under conditions of Lee's choosing. It was to be a game of "bluff" and intended to stampede the North into a desire for peace.

It is General Longstreet's connection with the Gettysburg Campaign and his relations with Lee at this time that have provoked the severe criticism that certain individuals in the South have directed against him. These charges have been variously stated, but in substance they are as follows:¹

. . . . Before stating these charges, however, there is one observation that should be kept in mind: no whisper of any of these accusations was made until after death had come to still the lips of Robert E. Lee; and to this date there has not been produced one shred of acceptable evidence that General Lee had ever instigated or authorized any such charges or knew that they were being considered.

General William E. Pendleton a clergyman, in an address delivered on January 17, 1873, at the dedication of the Lee Chapel at Lexington, Virginia, charged Longstreet with disobeying an order of General Lee to attack at sunrise on July 2. General John B. Gordon addressed a larger audience. He published the statement that "General Lee died believing (the testimony of this point is overwhelming) [sic] that he lost Gettysburg at last by Longstreet's disobedience of orders."² The lesser charges included unnecessary and deliberate delay on July 2, both in arriving on the field and in disposing his corps for the attack; failing to support Pickett on July 3; and in maintaining an attitude of disloyalty to Lee throughout the entire battle. These were serious charges.

The South, in search of a scapegoat, rebounded to them and they spread from mouth to mouth. It was months before they came to the attention of General Longstreet. General Lee had been dead for over two years and could not be appealed to . . . Had these charges been true, Longstreet's retention in command after Gettysburg was a huge inconsistency.

To determine to what extent these charges were true, if at all true, becomes increasingly difficult as time passes. Viewing the events and incidents through the medium of time, the

¹ quoted from the complete dissertation in the University of Chicago Libraries.

² J. B. Gordon, Reminiscences of the Civil War (New York, 1903), p. 161.

evidence is not "overwhelming," as General Gordon said; on the contrary, it is doubtful whether any of the charges can be supported. Those who reported facts on the basis of participation in the battle may well have been mistaken. . . .

It is fortunate that there were witnesses who were not only able to view the whole battle but who, in addition to possessing a sense of detachment, were trained observers. Colonel Fremantle saw practically all of the fighting from a vantage point on Seminary Ridge and heard much of the discussion and most of the orders. . . .

... To return now to General Longstreet, whom we left in conference with General Lee on a ridge overlooking Cemetery Hill just as dusk settled on the scene of the preliminary Confederate successes. He says: "I drew my glasses and made a studied view of the position upon which the enemy was rallying his forces, and of the lay of the land surrounding. General Lee was engaged at the moment. He had announced beforehand that he would not make aggressive battle in the enemy's country. After the survey and in consideration of his plans,--noting movements of detachments of the enemy on the Emmitsburg Road, the relative positions for maneuver, the lofty perch of the enemy, the rocky slopes from it, all marking the position as clearly defensive,--I said, 'We could not call the enemy to position better suited to our plans. All that we have to do is to file around his left and secure good ground between him and his capital.' This, when said, was thought to be the opinion of my commander as much as my own. I was not a little surprised, therefore, at his impatience, as striking the air with his closed hand, he said, 'If he is there tomorrow I will attack him.'"¹

There is no other record of this conversation. From a position on Seminary Ridge it is quite possible to view the surrounding landscape for some distance. It is not possible, however, to see the terrain for a distance sufficient to warrant making the strategic movement proposed without added reconnaissance. We are faced with the alternative of believing either that Longstreet was already familiar with the geography of the area, or that some strange trick of memory has convinced him that his hind-sight was actually his fore-sight. . . . If he did make the suggestion which he claims to have made, it betrays a singular lack of appreciation of Lee's situation. Did he assume that Meade would sit quietly in position and let the Confederate army maneuver at will? No wonder General Lee expressed irritation and betrayed impatience.

Knowing General Longstreet's experience and studying closely his tactical suggestions, . . . it is more probable that what he did suggest was a tactical envelopment of the Union left flank. He saw the necessity for battle; he was a skilled tactician. It was possible to view enough of the terrain and the general disposition of the Union forces to note that it favored such a plan. This would have given a very strong attack and might have succeeded if it could have been well coordinated.

¹James Longstreet, From Manassas to Appomattox (Philadelphia, 1896), p. 358.

General Lee's irritation is understandable. He had been surprised into battle on ground of the enemy's choosing. He must either fight or withdraw; he could no longer enjoy uninterrupted exploitation of the rich area of western Pennsylvania. He also was upset by the fact of Stuart's absence--his report emphasizes this point--but it is difficult to understand why all needful information could not have been supplied by the cavalry supposedly on his right flank and rear. It must have been disconcerting to have had his leisurely moving army rudely shocked into rapid marches;¹ and when one remembers that General Lee was a sick man, having suffered for some time the pangs of a stubborn case of rheumatism,² his irritation and apparent loss of poise are all the more understandable. Any general would have been irritated by such a combination of circumstances. Longstreet's suggestion ran counter to what Lee had already decided on, and for the moment his emotion took control and brought forth that expression of determination.

General Longstreet's recommendation was proper for one in his position. . . . The intimacy that had long characterized the relations of General Lee and his chief subordinate would have justified even greater protest on the part of the latter, had he believed his commander to be in error. No censure should be made of this act of Longstreet's; nor should Lee be criticized for rejecting it in favor of direct attack. He was in command and his was the final decision.

. As the first day's fighting came to an end "five" of the nine Confederate divisions were still on the march, and the whole of Longstreet's corps, which had been passed by the trains of the Third Corps, owing to indifferent staff arrangements, was too far distant to reach the field that night."³

¹ Sir Frederick Maurice, An Aide-de-Camp of Lee: The Papers of Colonel Marshall (Boston, 1927), p. 229. Colonel Marshall is authority for the statement that the rate of march was low even after the concentration was ordered, as the weather was hot and inclement, and the exact locations of Meade's several corps were still unknown. General Lee also admits this in his first report to President Davis. General Lee thought Meade to be much farther south than where he actually was on June 30. This explains the perplexing series of surprises and was the basis for the attempted concentration on Cashtown--an ideal defensive position--which could have turned out badly for the Confederates but for the warning conveyed by Heth's first clash with Buford on the 30th. Had a normal rate of march been taken, the entire Confederate army could have been assembled at Gettysburg on the morning of July 1.

² Series I, Official Records of the Union and Confederate Armies (Washington, D. C., 1880-1898), Vol. LII, Part 2, p. 549.

³ Cecil Battine, The Crisis of the Confederacy (London, England, 1925), p. 205.

Of the four divisions engaged, two were exhausted, but Early's and Pender's were fit for further action. Had they but pressed on, the result would have been the capture of Cemetery Hill. Given discretionary orders, General Ewell did not permit Early to clinch his first success.

When night came, General Lee, with his mind seeking some solution to his problem, seems first to have entertained the idea of attacking the Union right; but Ewell, with whom he conferred, had countered with a plan that fresh troops should assault the Union left while he enveloped the flank which Early had driven back. Not wholly convinced, however, Lee tentatively accepted Ewell's plan which he later announced to his corps commanders, who had assembled on Seminary Hill. . . .

When the conference ended, it was understood that Longstreet should push his march and come up promptly to make the attack on the Union left, and that the battle on the left--that is, Ewell's attack--should start with the sound of Longstreet's guns. No detailed plan was announced, nor did General Lee set an hour for the battle. Too much depended on the time when sufficient troops could arrive to warrant launching the attack. In fact, there seems to have been a decided reservation in Lee's mind that conditions the next day might not justify the plan of battle which had been tentatively settled. After another reconnaissance in the morning, final orders could be given.

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As we enter upon a discussion of the great battle which opened the following day, and of General's Longstreet's participation in it, certain data should be kept in mind. A heavy burden of criticism has been directed against General Longstreet for an alleged unnecessary delay on July 2--both in arriving with his corps at the scene of battle and, afterward, in moving into his "jump off" position.¹ There should be little difficulty in answering this if the reader will consider the elements of time, space, and the size of the forces involved. The trouble with most critics has been that they have neglected to consider these factors From these elements of time and space and size of force, which can be figured with reasonable accuracy, and from the facts which are of record, it is possible to reconstruct the movement of the First Corps

¹Battine, op. cit., p. 221: "The divisions of McLaws and Hood at the first streak of dawn had been aroused to continue the march. They had gone no farther, however, than the Willoughby Run when the column was halted they remained until noon, awaiting the arrival of McLaws' Brigade;"
Walter H. Taylor, Four Years with General Lee (New York, 1878), p. 99: "It is generally conceded that General Longstreet, on this occasion, [the march to the battlefield and later into position] was fairly chargeable with tardiness"; Gordon, op. cit., p. 161: "General Lee distinctly ordered Longstreet to attack early on the morning of the second day but Longstreet delayed the attack until four o'clock in the afternoon"; Maurice, p. 234: "Longstreet appears to have delayed in the hope of changing Lee's mind"; G. Moxley Sorrel, Recollections of a Confederate Staff Officer (New York, 1905), p. 167: "There was apparently apathy in his [Longstreet's] movements. . . ."

with some degree of exactness. Also there were witnesses who were both impartial and competent.

Let us commence with Colonel Fremantle. He states that ". . . we all got up at 3:30 A.M., and breakfasted a little before daylight. . . I arrived at 5:00 A.M. at the same commanding position we were on yesterday, and I climbed a tree in company with Captain Scheibert of the Prussian Army. Just below us were seated Generals Lee, [A.P.] Hill, Longstreet, and Hood, in consultation . . . General Heth was also present . . ." ¹ This would seem to fix the time of Longstreet's arrival in person as before 5:00 A.M.

The real point at issue is the hour when Longstreet's corps came up. How soon could they have come up? The bivouac of the First Corps was between Greenwood and Cashtown for the main body, with some of the leading troops (McLaws' division) strung out along Marsh Creek--about four miles west of Gettysburg. These leading elements did not reach their camp sites until after midnight. ² As nearly as can be determined, some of McLaws' division camped along the Cashtown Pike between that point and Marsh Creek. The troops rose about 3:30 on the morning of the 2d. It would take them at least an hour to breakfast, form, and move out on the road. If the preparations were made promptly, the head of the column would start at about 4:30. The rate of march could not have exceeded two miles an hour, as the road was one-way, running up hill, and probably choked with stragglers, wounded, and broken equipment. The rate may well have been forced back to one and three-quarters miles an hour. The earliest that the head of the column could reach the point of assembly on Seminary Ridge would be about 7:00 A.M., and this would call for a strong march, good march discipline, and continued progress.

Turning again to Colonel Fremantle: "At 7:00 A.M., I rode over part of the ground with General Longstreet and saw him disposing McLaws' division for today's fight." ³ What Colonel Fremantle had reference to, undoubtedly, is the fact that the head of McLaws' division had come up at that hour and that General Longstreet in person was conducting it to an assembly area as part of the development for the battle. Now as to the remainder of the column: On the eve of the clash at Gettysburg the First Corps--that is, those who were up--numbered in round figures 15,000 officers and men, 84 guns and at least as many caissons, and about 150 wagons in the combat train. The road space for the First Corps (less Pickett's division, which was still back at Chambersburg), was 13,950 yards, or 7.9 miles. This assumes that the march discipline was perfect, that there was no straggling, and that the men marched in fours well closed up and with no gaps in the column. Translated into time, the distance represents 3.5 hours, at two and one-quarter miles per hour; 3.96 hours at two miles per hour; and 4.5 hours at the rate of one and three-quarters miles an hour. From head to tail of Longstreet's column there was a time element of better than three and one-half hours; or, stated otherwise, the

¹ Sir Arthur Lyon Fremantle, Three Months in the Southern States (London, 1863); p. 263.

² Longstreet, op. cit., p. 361.

³ Fremantle, op. cit., p. 263.

tail of the column would arrive at the assembly area at approximately 10:30 on the morning of July 2d.

Could it have come up earlier? A forced march during the night would have gained an hour or so, but at the risk of having the troops unfit for continued participation in the fight. Had they come earlier under such march conditions, a rest would have been imperative; so it matters little whether they rested at Marsh Creek or on Seminary Ridge as far as the time element is concerned. . . . Longstreet's men had had a tiresome march on the previous day; they had reached their bivouacs late, had risen before daylight, and had a march of some three hours to face. To have demanded more of them at that time would have detracted from their battle efficiency when they did reach the ground. There seems to have been no unreasonable delay during this march to battle.¹

Once up, did General Longstreet delay putting his troops into the fight? It seems fairly well established that General Lee was engaged in making a reconnaissance along the line that morning, and at the hour of 10:30 was somewhere on his left front. Although a tentative decision had been made the evening before, General Lee had not fully decided just where he would strike. During this morning survey of the positions, he decided to attack the enemy's left and attempt to seize the ground before the Round Tops. He then at 11:00 o'clock issued his orders.

After the orders were issued which contemplated that the First Corps would attack the Federal left, the next move was to conduct the troops to their place in the line of battle. The distance from where the men were assembled to the center of the front to be occupied by General Longstreet was some three miles as the crow flies. If, however, we consider the twists and turns of the mountain trails and the routes to be followed in order to hide the movement from the enemy, this distance may be doubled or even trebled. A march across country moves at a less rate than a march on roads. It is rarely faster than one mile an hour. The minimum time for Longstreet's movement to the left would be greater than three hours, and the maximum would run over six. Considering the distance and the type of march, arrival in position for the attack could not be expected before 2:00 o'clock and might be extended to about 6:00 in the evening. Anything between these extremes may be assumed with equal propriety.

Various accounts have stated that General Lee was disturbed and irritated because the First Corps was slow in getting into position. That is quite possible. The march of the First Corps was normal, and when one is anxious to get down to business, anything that is normal appears to be slow. One must not forget that the problem confronting General Lee was such as to cause him great concern. Already he was forced to fight on ground of the enemy's choosing, with limited information concerning the hostile dispositions; and he was probably disappointed in that nothing fruitful had come from the discretionary orders he had given Ewell the previous afternoon.

¹A very frank discussion of this is contained in Taylor, Four Years with General Lee, commencing with page 98.

Anyone in General Lee's position that morning would have been distressed that the entire army was not up and ready for instant battle. But this does not mean that any one of his corps commanders had failed to make every effort to be there.

The most significant answer is that the march to the left was made under the control of one of General Lee's staff. Colonel Sorrel, who occupies the position of General Longstreet's Boswell, says that "much valuable time was lost by this trial [i.e., seeking hidden routes], which with better knowledge of the ground by General Lee's engineers would not have been attempted." Some delay was also occasioned when the infantry was halted at a road fork which was exposed to hostile observation and the guide sought new routes. According to General Alexander, this held up the battle some two hours.²

General Longstreet's comments on the delay are caustic. Finally, he took matters into his own hands, doubled Hood's column and marched it directly to the position under cover of its own scouts.³ Whatever slowness there was in this march may, therefore, be charged against General Lee's engineer and reconnaissance officer.

Anderson--in the lead and on the side nearer the enemy--had small skirmishes while moving up. Since his division was the base for the deployment, some delay occurred until the enemy was quieted. Eventually the First Corps arrived. Anderson was on the right of Hill's corps, and on his right came McLaws and then Hood. General Longstreet states that he had no cavalry to cover the extreme right.⁴ Hood spread his troops in a partial envelopment of the Federal left (Sickles), while McLaws massed his brigades near the forward crest of the Peach Orchard. The ground in front of McLaws was not difficult, but that facing Hood was rugged and broken, hard for foot troops, and offering little opportunity to use artillery. Hood made repeated requests to be permitted to move his division more to the right so as to cut around Sickles' left, but each request was denied by Longstreet with the statement that General Lee had directed the attack to be made up the Emmitsburg Road.⁵

The artillery preparation commenced about 3:30 P.M., and the infantry attack followed some thirty minutes later. In Longstreet's front was the IIId Corps in a very strong position, with supports immediately available from the IID and Vth Corps. The defensive position was so laid out that Humphreys and Birney, who held the line on the right and left, brought flanking fire to bear on the Confederate skirmishers as they crossed the ground dodging from boulder to boulder. A concerted advance was impossible. In the rear of the first enemy line and between the position and Little Round Top was a section of ground known as the Devil's Den--a tangled mass of boulders and gulleys, all guarded by a steep upheaval of rock some eighty feet in height.

¹Sorrel, op. cit., p. 169

²E. P. Alexander, Military Memoirs of a Confederate (New York, 1907), p. 366.

³Longstreet, op. cit., p. 366. ⁴Ibid., p. 365.

⁵See General J. B. Hood's account in Advance and Retreat (New Orleans, 1880), also Alexander, op. cit., p. 394.

Hood's attack went forward fiercely with McLaws in close support. The Union line broke; then was pushed back beyond the Devil's Den to the line of the Round Tops. The fighting was tremendous; the losses, sickening. Hood went down, and Law, who had marched since three o'clock in the morning from Chambersburg, succeeded to command. Longstreet was out in front leading his troops in person--with "splendid effect," says Sorrel, "his fine horsemanship as he rode, hat in hand, and [his] martial figure were most inspiring." General Alexander says it was most unfortunate that General Lee was not present, as the concerted attack of the whole line failed due to lack of coordination. Ewell and A.P. Hill were supposed to support Longstreet strongly, but their effort was limited to artillery fire; Anderson's division became spectators, and the attack was made piecemeal. He says further that "Longstreet, of course, is responsible, but every commanding officer takes great risks when he leaves such important movements without supervision. . . . few battlefields can furnish examples of worse tactics."

But was Longstreet charged with coordinating the whole Confederate attack? No; but he was responsible that his own attack was coordinated. In this he failed.

During this day General Longstreet twice offended. The first instance was in recurring to his proposed movement by Meade's left. While awaiting the arrival of his troops at the assembly point on Seminary Ridge, he again urged General Lee to abandon the direct attack in favor of a strong advance around the Union left. He "spent precious time in arguing with his superior," in an attempt to impose his ideas on Lee, who had already announced his course of action. Though this caused no delay, as the First Corps was not yet arrived on Seminary Ridge, it was certainly impolitic. Longstreet may have felt, and somewhat justly so in view of past relations with his chief, that as second in command he was possessed of a freedom to make suggestions befitting this position whenever he chose. But with the decision once made, suggestions for a change in plan were out of place; and, furthermore, when making these suggestions, General Longstreet evidenced a degree of impatience with Lee which is deserving of unfavorable comment. A much better attitude would have been for him to have accepted the decision of his superior and to have thrown himself into it with enthusiasm.

The second instance was much more likely to have caused disaster. In fixing his attention on personal troop leadership, Longstreet failed to coordinate his own attack. The progressive infiltration of brigades did not work out well, and some of his units never did get into the fight in time to be of use. It is a curious thing that this, the most serious charge to be laid against General Longstreet, has gone unnoticed by nearly all of his critics. Viewing the battle as a soldier, it is impossible to find any justification for a corps commander taking a position in front of a regiment, mounted, and with hat in hand waving them on to victory. In thus stepping down from his proper place and assuming the duties of a regimental commander, General Longstreet lost control of the battle as a whole. There was no necessity for such action.

The results of the second day's fighting were sufficient to warrant a continuation of the attack next day. Longstreet's corps bivouacked on the ground they had won, while on the left, no further success had been granted either Ewell or Hill. The Confederate left had been engaged at one time or another--sometimes heavily--but the assaults were never made in concert. The results were of no help to Longstreet, nor were they of much aid in furthering General Lee's plans. The losses had been heavy--unusually so among the higher ranking officers--but the indications were that the Union loss was equally great. In fact, the pressure of the Confederate attack had been so fierce that General Meade called a council of war, and the decision to remain in position for another day's fighting came as a result of a hesitating vote of a majority of Meade's corps and division commanders. But for the fortuitous moral strength which came to him from the members of his council, Meade would have ordered a retirement of the line of Big Pipe Creek,¹ and Lee would have remained master of a hard fought field.

It was now daylight on the 3d. The two leaders made a joint inspection of the front, and shortly thereafter General Lee gave out the substance of his plans for the day. He announced that he had decided on an assault of the Union center by a column of detachments from both McLaws and Hood together with Pickett's division, which had come up from its provost duty at Chambersburg on the previous day.² General Longstreet raised instant objection to the weakening of either McLaws or Hood. Neither could spare men from their lines as they were faced by 20,000 determined Federal troops, who could, at the first indication of a lessening of the forces in their front, bear down on the Southern right and catch any assaulting column in the right flank, crush it, and thus open the way to launch a move across Lee's line of communications. Longstreet argued further that a minimum of 30,000 men should be in this grand assault. With the exception of Pickett's division--and even he had had a heavy march--the others had been through severe fighting on the 2d. Considering the front over which the assault must move, General Longstreet pointed out that it was exposed to both artillery and small arms fire for nearly a mile, and that the way lay up an uniform grade which could be swept at close quarters by a devastating flanking fire from Federal salients on either side. This protest was made in all seriousness, and was perfectly proper. It came as a shock to Longstreet that Lee would chance such a desperate game. He could see nothing but evil in it.

General Lee again expressed impatience. He discounted the open distance to about 1400 yards of maximum exposure, added that Hood and McLaws should "remain on the defensive" sic while Pickett would be reinforced by divisions from the Third Corps. General Lee next designated the point of the attack and stipulated that the column should be composed of 15,000 men.³

¹See General Gibbon's account in Battles and Leaders of the Civil War (New York, 1887), III, 313. (Cited hereafter as B & L.)

²Taylor, op. cit., p. 103.

³Longstreet, op. cit., p. 386.

Longstreet again registered opposition to the plan. His reply to Lee (if we may trust the wording as contained in his story of the affair) was dignified, yet verging on insubordination. "I have been a soldier I may say, from the ranks up to the position I now hold. I have been in pretty much all kinds of skirmishes, from those of two or three soldiers up to those of an army corps, and I think I can safely say there never was a body of fifteen thousand men who could make that attack successfully."¹ This amounts to a flat declaration that Longstreet had no faith in General Lee's tactical program.

..... According to Colonel Taylor who was present at the conference between Lee and Longstreet, it was never intended that Pickett's weak division of about 5,000 men should bear the entire burden of the assault.² Colonel Taylor's understanding of the plan was that "Longstreet should endeavor to force the enemy's lines in his front."³ General Lee planned to strengthen the attacking force with reinforcements drawn from his center troops (Hill's corps). Heth was designated as being available, as were Lane and Scales from Pender's division. The charge was to be preceded by an intense artillery preparation of all guns under General Alexander, which was intended to silence the hostile batteries and open the way for a sweeping forward movement after the main assault had penetrated the Union lines. Fifteen thousand men were to cross an open slope; first downward to a small stream, then rising slowly to the heights on which the Federal Army was in position.

..... The artillery opened at 1:00 o'clock. Two hours later as the Federal fire slackened, General Alexander sent word to Longstreet that he must launch the attack or it would be too late. Pickett rode up to General Longstreet for orders. Longstreet could not meet those flashing eyes and view that gallant figure. He says: "I was convinced that he would be leading his troops to needless slaughter, and did not speak. He repeated the question, and without opening my lips, I bowed in answer. In a determined voice Pickett said: 'Sir, I shall lead my division forward.' He remounted his horse and rode back to his command."⁴

..... Pickett moved out. Sitting lightly in the saddle, he led his troops, while the breeze set his long hair in motion as it flowed down over his shoulders. The solid line marched forward over the crest of the slope as if on parade and was soon beyond the line of batteries. Alexander's guns were lifted, and the shot poured over the heads of the advancing infantry. Gaps now began to appear in the ranks, and the hillside was soon spotted with small black dots. The gaps closed; the march went bravely on. Longstreet watched it with straining eyes, and soon ordered McLaws and Hood to move in closer and be ready

¹ B & L, III, 343.

² Pickett had but three brigades at Gettysburg; the others had been left behind at Hanover Junction.

³ Taylor, op. cit., pp. 103 et seq.

⁴ Soldier of the South: Pickett's War Letters to His Wife, edited by Arthur Crew Inman (New York, 1928), p. 69.

to charge at the moment Pickett hit the center. But the Federal line was too long to be contained by the remainder of Longstreet's corps. It commenced to give trouble on the right; and although support had been promised by Hill on the left, none came. It was as if the entire Confederate army had elected to become the audience of this grand spectacle. General Edward Johnson, who had been reinforced by two brigades from Rhodes' and one from Early's division to make a diversion on the extreme left, plunged into the battle before the preparations were completed; and by the time Pickett started, the attack on the left had worn itself out.

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But the Third Corps was not committed to battle. Although General Lee was with General Hill at the time and was surrounded by his staff, no effort appears to have been made to throw the Third Corps into the fight to create a diversion in favor of Pickett. Thus the entire Federal army maneuvered at will to bring maximum fire power and mass to bear against the gallant brigades which had now reached the line of the Union artillery.

When Pickett saw the press of the enemy reinforcements and realized the hopelessness of his position, he gave the order to retire. The troops withdrew slowly and in good order under a terrific cannonade and devastating small-arms fire. The last charge had failed. It was beyond the ability of even 15,000 men to hold their positions against such overwhelming numbers.

How far is General Longstreet to be blamed for the results of this third day's attack? He was charged with the preparation for the advance and the formation of the troops. He was given the power to decide when the attack should start. But he was not charged with the coordination of the supporting assaults on the left. This was General Lee's responsibility. Why had Pickett failed? Not because of Longstreet. Sheer force of numbers had forced his retirement. There was no concert of action. And the blame for this rests squarely on those members of General Lee's staff who were charged with the mission of coordinating the whole action. They should have been all along the line giving needful orders in the name of their commander to insure that the plans would go through successfully. And the ultimate responsibility must rest with General Lee, since he was in a position to view the action and thus direct movements which were not being undertaken as had been contemplated. He was in command.¹

Longstreet had no heart for the task before him; that much was evident. He forecasted the result. Did he do all that he could to make it a success? It might be charged that his lack

¹ Battine's comment on General Lee's staff (op. cit., p. 255) was: "The lack of staff officers always increased the difficulty of combining the movements of troops in attack; nevertheless the inaction of Lee himself during the struggle on Culp's Hill, the unmistakable signs of which must have reached his eyes and ears, is difficult to account for. Only one mile and a half separated him from the fighting lines, and no one better than he should have appreciated the absolute necessity of winning a decisive victory and the necessity of harmonious action to obtain it."

of faith in the assault was transmitted to the troops with a subsequent lessening of morale.¹ This is extremely doubtful; at least, the conduct of the attack does not warrant any such conclusion. Too much has been made of the incident. Had General Lee deemed it of sufficient importance he would have selected some other commander. Our knowledge of Lee makes this conclusion inescapable.

It also appears that all of the Confederate artillery did not participate in the preparation. This was noticeable after the infantry attack was launched. General Pendleton,² who acted as Lee's chief of artillery, had taken upon himself to move some of the guns which General Alexander believed to be under his command. When Pickett actually moved forward, there were no reserve guns and there was no additional supply of ammunition. Colonel Marshall says that the fact that the artillery ammunitions was so far reduced was not reported to General Lee.³ This seems clearly a matter of neglect on the part of General Pendleton--another indication of faulty staff work. As a result, Pickett reached the crisis of the assault with little or no artillery support.

That night when the battle was over and calm restored, General Longstreet was still with his men or at the side of his commander in consultation. We do not know what words passed between them; yet we may be certain the strong bond of loyalty and courage and comradeship which had been forged was still intact. General Lee still needed the broad shoulders of his "Old War Horse."

As to Lee's failure at Gettysburg, many causes have been advanced. Most critics seek to absolve General Lee from any and all responsibility. This is unfortunate and something which General Lee would object to if it were possible for him to speak. General Lee tried for the impossible--and lost. He wrote to the President on July 31: "No blame can be attached to the army for a failure to accomplish what was projected by me, nor should it be censured for the unreasonable expectations of the public--I am alone to blame, in perhaps expecting too much of its prowess and valour."⁴

The return to Virginia from the field of Gettysburg required the utmost in skill and patience on the part of General Lee and his lesser commanders. Fortunately for Lee, General Meade was not energetic in his pursuit. The rear of the Confederate army was

¹ Ibid., p. 257; Battine criticizes Longstreet severely; ". . . he allowed his disapproval of the scheme to be seen by his officers, in which he was greatly to blame."

² Who personally made severe charges against Longstreet later concerning this very battle.

³ Maurice, op. cit., p. 240.

⁴ Lee's Dispatches to President Davis, edited by Douglas S. Freeman (New York, 1915), p. 110, Despatch No. 60.

well covered and, under Longstreet's supervision, the whole force was safely transferred to the Virginia shores near Williamsport with only small losses. A few days and the Army of Northern Virginia was back in the trenches behind the Rappahannock.

With the coming of a period of quiet, General Longstreet turned his thoughts again to the West, where the South had recently lost the critical city of Vicksburg and, as a consequence, control over the Mississippi. He brought up again his strategic conception of an offensive in the West as the best defense for the South. The President wanted Lee to go West to command, but Lee declined; so Longstreet next was designated and sent with part of the First Corps to reinforce General Bragg in the hope that Bragg could defeat Rosecrans, who opposed him just south of Chattanooga and drove him back to the Ohio Valley.

Vexatious delays due to faulty railroad arrangements held the troops in Virginia which ought to have been rushing to Bragg's assistance. Only a division or so was able to arrive in time to participate in the first day's fighting along West Chickamauga Creek. Longstreet, with his staff, did not join Bragg until nearly midnight after the first day's battle. Without opportunity for reconnaissance and with a mixed command, he was designated to command Bragg's left wing in the next day's battle.

The Confederate plan contemplated an attack by successive echelons from the right to drive Rosecrans to the left into a pocket in the angle formed between the mountains and Chickamauga Creek. This would cut the Union army from its base and severely restrict its ability to maneuver.

The battle on September 19 was late in starting. Things were not going as well as planned for the Confederates, when the Union right was weakened. This Longstreet saw; and without awaiting his turn to attack by echelon, he plunged his mixed corps for-

ward, cut through the Union line, and then turned it back to the right. The extreme Union right was cut off and captured. It was a terrific attack, and shortly most of the Union army was driven from the field in disorder. Only Thomas--the Rock of Chickamauga--was able to hold his ground until the Union reserves came up and enabled him to retire with his forces under control. It was a decisive victory and only needed a prompt Confederate pursuit to drive Rosecrans back and destroy him. This Longstreet urged, but Bragg delayed and then attempted the siege of Chattanooga. It was a fatal blunder.

General Longstreet was so incensed at Bragg that he unwisely attempted to have him ousted so that Lee could come West to assume command. This action brought the hostility of President Davis and created a very unfortunate situation between the followers of Bragg and those of Longstreet; and, it may be added, this situation was partly the cause of Longstreet's utter failure as an independent commander over a mixed force in the Knoxville and East Tennessee Campaigns, which followed Chickamauga and lasted until the spring of 1864.

Grant's appointment as Commander-in-Chief of the Union Armies and his plan to drive against Lee's army caused the return of Longstreet and his corps to the Army of Northern Virginia in time to participate in the opening battle of the Wilderness Campaign, May 5-6, 1864. Posted too far to the south to participate in the opening skirmish, Longstreet led a forced march and arrived just as the Confederate line was breaking under the severe pounding of Grant's numbers. He stopped the Union advance; then, after discovering a weakness on the Union extreme right, organized a counter attack which was led by his chief Aide and threw the Union lines into great confusion. Just as Longstreet was issuing his instructions for continuing the attack, he was accidentally struck

by fire from his own men and desperately wounded. Although he urged that the attack go on as planned, it was changed by General Lee. The lessening of the pressure gave Grant a chance to reform his shattered divisions and thus the opportunity was lost.

General Longstreet was not fit for full duty until late in the fall and even then his right arm was paralyzed. He rejoined the First Corps late in October on General Lee's specific request. This would seem the best refutation of the notion that Lee had desired to be rid of Longstreet. Lee designated him to command the left wing. Later he was in charge of field operations.

The Confederate Army now was backed up against Richmond and Petersburg, while Grant slowly edged his way around Lee's right in an attempt to surround and capture him. Although Longstreet covered Richmond successfully on the east, sheer force of numbers brought the inevitable result:--Lee was forced back; Richmond fell; and the collapse of the Confederacy was hastened. Still fighting valiantly, Lee, with his rapidly shrinking army, strove to reach the mountains, but Grant's hard marching infantry gained the Confederate rear. The Army was surrendered at Appomattox Court House on April 9, 1865. The War was over.

During this last six months of the war, Longstreet did noble service and proved over and over again his devotion to Lee and the cause of the South.

Did James Longstreet measure up to what one should expect of him after his wide experience as a soldier? It is a significant question. The several accusations against Longstreet were based largely (I believe) on the fact of his becoming affiliated with the Republican party soon after the War ended. No other satisfactory explanation has been found.

As a man, we know too little of him; as a soldier he challenges the interest.

Strong, aggressive, capable--he brought a wealth of experience as his offering to the cause of the South. Modest and forgetful of self, he asked for an obscure position. One wiser than he put him out in front to inspire men and lead them to victory. Although General Longstreet rose no higher than a troop leader, he was almost without an equal in this field. Few have attained his ability to lead troops in battle. He was, without doubt, the greatest fighter on the Southern side, and compares with the Union general, Thomas, as the best defensive general of the War. One sweeps along with him in battle after battle, impressed with the fact that he was a master of his trade.

His personal contribution to the Confederacy was great, and the profession of arms was enriched by his gifts of military accomplishment. He made mistakes . . . but his mistakes taught him the most in his school of experience. In the scientific side of warfare, he soon became an expert; and clearly apart from their military value to the South, his methods became models of the application of tactics to definite problems. Much that is in use today in offensive and defensive tactics and organization may be traced to the Longstreet methods, which commenced to appear as early as 1862.

From the small beginnings at Blackburn's Ford, where he first pointed the way to a proper defense of a river line--a thin line of scouts in observation backed up by masses so disposed that any part of the line could be reinforced equally in a minimum length of time--may be traced the elastic defense that became the basis for the French system in the World War. At Williamsburg he added another element in his employment of the local counter-attack as a part of the defensive system. The use of the ground--not as a stage on which to play the game, but as an integral part of the tactical scheme--is older perhaps than the Civil War, but James Longstreet brought it forward scientifically and coordinated it with the other elements of the defense until he achieved the most complete blending of troops, fire-power, and terrain that the world had yet seen. This was his contribution in both the line of the Rappahannock and in the defensive zone of Petersburg. In the former work he brought forth the traversed trench, which transcends in importance whatever else he may have given to his profession.

Boonsborough and Sharpsburg show Longstreet at his best as a defensive fighter when pressed by heavy odds. . . . It was Longstreet who took the brunt of the attack at Fredericksburg; it was Longstreet who raced ahead and held the passes of the Blue Ridge when Lee was struggling back from Gettysburg; and, again, it was James Longstreet who parried every thrust at Richmond from the North and East during the trying winter of 1864-1865.

As an offensive fighter he was even more skilful than when charged with the defense. We find this shown best at Chickamauga and in the Wilderness. In each case he opened the way for a culminating and successful blow against the invading army. In these two engagements we see also his scheme for offensive organization. General Longstreet was a great advocate of the penetrating attack where masses of troops were formed at close distance behind each other to give a crushing

effect. This powerful form of an attack enabled the First Corps to drive deep into the enemy lines and fasten on the hostile reserve, paralyzing its movement and enabling the enveloping wing of Lee's forces to reach around and complete the destruction. From Longstreet's four-unit or quadrilateral divisional organization and the employment of his units in masses at half-distance in columns, may be traced the steady development of the American and European systems of attack in penetration. It was this devastating leap-frogging of mass upon mass that broke through the lines at Chickamauga and in the Wilderness.

Although lacking the strategic conception of Lee or Jackson, General Longstreet was superior to both in his knowledge of tactics. As a tactician, James Longstreet was the best equipped officer in the Confederacy to understand the sway of battle and to lead his troops to best effect. Time after time his knowledge of battle tactics not only saved the Southern Army, but opened the way for the counter-offensive. Perhaps his most outstanding exhibition of tactical judgment came in the forcing of the defile at Thoroughfare Gap in the early stages of the campaign against Pope. And one should not forget his cool-headed remonstrance when Lee would have plunged him headlong into an undetermined force shortly after the First Corps arrived on the field at Second Manassas. For perfect timing, one has but to study his employment of the reserves when the moment came to crush the Union right which Pope had thrown so blindly across his front in a frenzied desire to grapple with Jackson. As a tactician he undoubtedly lacked Jackson's delicacy of touch; but where Jackson excelled in flexibility of movement with small forces, James Longstreet was much abler in handling a corps, and brought a much more destructive pressure on the enemy when and where needed. Jackson might stir up the hares, but Longstreet would fall on them and crush them.

As a troop leader, General Longstreet excelled. He schooled his officers well and exacted the highest form of discipline from the members of his command. His men never straggled; when his corps arrived, all his corps was there. Regardful of his soldiers, he never failed, however, when occasion demanded to over-ride their comfort and to whip them on with his unflagging zeal through the most severe hardship. Knowing men, he lost little time in winning them to him. From the staff to the lowliest private in the ranks, all were fanatical in their devotion, and all were filled with the fighting spirit of James Longstreet. He made the name of the First Corps of the Army of Northern Virginia one that would ring from end to end of the Confederacy with its deeds of valor.

As a strategist, General Longstreet was a better critic than inventor. His one successful strategic conception was that of urging an offensive in the West in the spring of 1863. Although the importance of this theater had been brought to the attention of the War Department by Albert Sidney Johnston, General Longstreet appears to have been the first to suggest the use of "interior lines" and the coordination of an offensive in the West with defensive or minor offensive operations in the Eastern theater. He saw Chattanooga to be the gateway to the heart of the South.

Unfretted by a sense of responsibility for the safety of Virginia, General Longstreet was thinking in terms of the whole Confederacy when he proposed a movement to the Ohio Valley through Kentucky as the true avenue to ultimate military success. Excellent in every respect, this plan might have succeeded had a Lee been available to command. Had not General Lee come forward with his alternative of crossing the Potomac and invading Pennsylvania, General Longstreet would probably have gone West to head the operations. In view of the way in which the Gettysburg Campaign turned out, it may have been more fortunate for the South had she chanced her main effort in the West.

But a doubt arises whether an invasion of the Ohio Valley under Longstreet's leadership could have gained any material success. General Longstreet was not successful in independent command. He was not in the fullest sense of the term a general. As we see him at Knoxville, he was a badly harassed man, and seemingly incapable of exercising definite and sound decision. Perhaps no one could have surmounted the difficulties; perhaps even the great Lee would have gone down in defeat; but there seemed to be a fatal lack of harmony in Longstreet's command which precluded any success.

In spite of his failure to measure up to the fullest degree of generalship, General Longstreet's attributes of sound tactical judgment, common sense and simple directness of thought made him invaluable to Lee. It was no idle remark when Lee spoke of consulting with Longstreet when his ideas were running in a circle. General Longstreet was an able critic; and in him Lee found his much needed complement. Longstreet had the added virtue of being honest to the point of tactlessness in his comments. General Lee's audacity needed this tempering of criticism and contact with a more practical mind in matters of troop movement, battle dispositions, supply, and, above all, in tactics. Lee's greatness was builded on the work of such men as Longstreet and Jackson--Longstreet in tactics, Jackson in strategy.

How then shall we assess his true value to the South? Shall we catalogue his failures and list them in a parallel column with his successes? Or shall we seek first through the lists of the Confederacy for the man who could have replaced him? Was there another corps commander who could have stepped up to Lee's side and filled the place made vacant by James Longstreet? One searches the lists in vain. There was but one Longstreet, just as there had been but one Jackson. He was, in truth, Lee's "War Horse." Putting honor and duty above place, and ever squaring his conduct with the ethics of his chosen profession, General Longstreet left a heritage that deserves the respect of the South for generations to come. Time will not diminish the splendor of his services to the cause he chose to serve.

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The answer to the question would seem to be that James Longstreet did measure up to the fullness of his promise, and is deserving of kinder treatment from future writers and historians.

